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Abstract 
We present a model of industrial location and endogenous growth with congestion 
costs. According to the interplay between knowledge spillovers and commuting costs, we are 
able to obtain both a Krugman-type and a bell-shaped agglomeration outcome. In the first 
case, the economy experiences a permanent income inequality in the steady state and income 
divergence in the transitional dynamics. In the second case, we observe an enlargement of 
the industrial core of the economy with a strong catching up by the periphery. Welfare 
analysis shows that congestion create (in the bell-shaped agglomeration case) a negative 
welfare effect on peripheral unskilled workers and renders the agglomerated equilibrium 
Pareto inferior to dispersion.  
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* Bank of Italy, Regional Economic Research Staff, Milan Branch.  1 Introduction1
In their survey of the agglomeration and growth literature Baldwin and Martin (2004)
divide the history of world industrial location into two main waves. The ￿rst wave
consisted in a rapid industrialization of the \North" of the world and a sudden death
of all industrial activities in the \South" at both international and regional level (see
Hohenberg and Lees, 1985, for Europe; and Kim and Margo, 2004, for North America).
The second wave of globalization (i.e. the re-industrialization of the South) emerged
more recently and can be perfectly exempli￿ed by the spectacular rise of China and
India. Anyway, many second waves also have occurred on a smaller (regional) scale
in the past both in Europe (Combes and Overman, 2004) and in the US (Kim and
Margo, 2004).
In the last decade, a number of theoretical contributions (Walz, 1996 and 1997;
Baldwin and Forslid, 2000; Fujita and Thisse, 2002; Baldwin and Martin, 2004; Ce-
rina and Pigliaru, 2005) have addressed the issue of regional income divergence. They
show that the interaction between location of industrial activities and regional long-
run growth is not negligible as disparities in the agglomeration process tend to persist,
or even widen, once we allow for the existence of growth takeo￿s in standard New
Economic Geography (NEG) models. None of the existing dynamic models, anyway,
take into account the possibility of second waves, i.e. the industrial takeo￿ of the pe-
riphery. The reason is that in these models each region is treated as an a-dimensional
space, where all ￿rms can concentrate without congestion problems. This hypothesis,
apparently reasonable in the international analyses (e.g. Baldwin et al., 2001), is not
particularly appealing at regional level.
1I wish to thank Luciano Boggio, Vincenzo Dall’Aglio, Gianluca Femminis, Stefan Gruber,
Luigi Infante, Andrea Lamorgese, Antonella Nocco, Marcel Tirpak, the participants at semi-
nars/conferences in Verona, Las Vegas, Gent, Universit￿ a Cattolica (Milan) and Vienna and Chris-
tine Stone for editorial assistance. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily re￿ect those
of the Bank of Italy. Usual disclaimers apply.
3The aim of this paper is to build a model of agglomeration and growth that allows
for the existence of congestion costs in the form of a simple internal structure in each
region.2 The model extends the Fujita and Thisse (2002, ch. 11) (FT) framework of
Romerian growth with localized knowledge spillovers and patent immobility. In their
model, FT use a \footloose entrepreneur" framework in which skilled workers (i.e.
R&D workers) are allowed to migrate across regions. Interregional labour movements
create both a pecuniary externality in the typical form of expenditure shift and tech-
nological externality due to localized knowledge spillovers which are likely to boost
economic growth under agglomeration. They show that under capital immobility (i)
geography matters for growth, i.e. agglomeration is likely to increase the long-run
growth due to knowledge externalities; (ii) interregional trade integration leads to
catastrophic agglomeration and technical progress is likely to magnify the centripetal
forces and (iii) economic growth attenuates the distributional impact of catastrophic
agglomeration whenever knowledge spillovers are localized.
Compared with FT our results show that (i) congestion may a￿ect the long-run
(steady state) growth rate of the economy if congestion in the core signi￿cantly ham-
pers the creation of knowledge; (ii) whenever congestion costs in the core are strong
enough, the initial income divergence may be followed by a catching-up process by
peripheral regions (i.e. core-periphery reversal) and (iii) in the welfare analysis, ag-
glomeration might not be Pareto improving for the economy whenever congestion
signi￿cantly lowers the aggregate growth rate of the economy.
Although the core-periphery reversal (\bell-shaped" agglomeration) is not new in
2From the policy-maker’s point of view this is extremely interesting as there is great concern that
\agglomeration economies may be reduced by congestion" (Glaeser and Kahn, 2004). For example,
in its recent territorial review of the area of Milan the OECD (2006) points out that \The shortage of
housing and the ensuing prohibitive costs in the core of Milan pushed out into the periphery hordes of
workers [...]. [Milan’s] unique potential to build a comprehensive engine for innovation with regional,
national and international spillovers may fade out". This is regarded as a typical problem for all
industrialized regions in the OECD countries.
4the literature, we present it for the ￿rst time in a dynamic framework. This has a
number of advantages. First, it solves an intrinsic contradiction in the existing liter-
ature. Theoretical models make extensive use of knowldge spillovers, thus implying
that the space within a region is comparatively smaller than the distance across re-
gions, but they actually neglect the possibility of congestion in such a small area.
Second, it seems a better representation of reality, especially when we model the
core-periphery reversal process. While, in static models, dispersion implies that the
core region looses in terms of active ￿rms, in this model it involves just a greater
catching up by periphery: both regions continue to grow at positive rates, although
the periphery registers higher rates than the core (as actually happened in the post-
war core-periphery reversal in the US; see Holmes and Stevens, 2004). Third, this
model has particularly rich implications in terms of welfare analysis as we observe a
non-linear trade-o￿ between static losses and dynamic gains from agglomeration.
The economics of this model may be explained by the following scheme (Table 1),
in which we present the forces shaping the long-run equilibria and their relation with
the existing literature according to the following taxonomy:
￿ Static centripetal forces;
￿ Static centrifugal forces;
￿ Dynamic centripetal forces;
￿ Dynamic centrifugal forces.


















(￿) elements in the static NEG literature with congestion
(￿￿) elements in the dynamic agglomeration and growth literature
Static centripetal forces are due to the interaction between economies of scale
and transport costs. Scale economies attract more ￿rms in the larger markets, while
transportation costs attract skilled workers in the core due to a lower price level, thus
creating a demand linkage between location of production and location of demand.
Static centrifugal forces are linked to market-crowding in the ￿nal product markets
and commuting costs. A large number of ￿rms in a local market renders competition
particularly tough, thus reducing ￿rm pro￿ts and creating an incentive to escape from
crowded markets. Commuting costs, instead, are likely to reduce labour supply and
therefore net wages, creating an incentive for workers to leave large cities.
Dynamic centripetal forces take the form of localized knowledge spillovers. The
more concentrated the skilled workers, the higher their productivity and the aggregate
growth for the whole economy.
Dynamic centrifugal forces take the form of lower labour supply (due to commut-
ing) in the R&D sector, which harms the production of new varieties and aggregate
growth.
Asterisks indicate the elements already existing in the literature.3 This model
3We refer to Helpman (1998), Fujita et al. (1999, ch. 7), Picard and Zeng (2005), Tabuchi (1998),
Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Murata and Thisse (2005) for static NEG models with congestion costs.
We refer to Walz (1996 and 1997), Baldwin and Forslid (2000) and Fujita and Thisse (2002) for
6blends elements of the NEG literature and encompasses all existing migration models
in a uni￿ed framework. For example, the FT model can be easily obtained by setting
the commuting costs equal to zero, while the main results of static models with
congestion can be obtained by ￿xing the existing number of varieties. Footloose
Entrepreneur model results may be obtained by setting the commuting costs to zero
without growth. We also have an additional force (dynamic centrifugal) due to the
interaction between congestion and growth, which is entirely new and proves to be
extremely interesting in the analyses of the equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic features of the
model. In particular, in Section 2.1 we present the internal structure of each region,
in Section 2.2 we present the consumers’ problem, in Section 2.3 we present the
producers’ problem and in Section 2.4 we show the market clearing conditions and
the migration law of motion. In Section 3 we present the dynamic framework of the
model: the steady-state growth path when skilled workers are immobile (3.1) and the
steady-state growth path when migration is possible (3.2). In Section 4 we present the
welfare impact of the emergence of a core-periphery equilibrium. Section 5 concludes
the paper. Appendix 1 shows an exercise of comparative statics achieved by numerical
simulations. Appendix 2 includes proofs of the propositions of the model.
2 The model
2.1 Commuting costs and skilled labour supply
Suppose there are two regions (A and B), two factors (skilled workers H and unskilled
workers L) and four goods/sectors (an industrial horizontally di￿erentiated one, a
traditional one, R&D and land). L-workers work in both the industrial and traditional
dynamic models with migration and to Baldwin and Martin (2004) and Cerina and Pigliaru (2005)
for surveys on \Footloose Capital" dynamic models.
7sectors as unique factor of production, while H-workers are employed in the R&D
(patent) sector. Workers in this sector work at the creation of new varieties of the
industrial good. As in FT, we assume that unskilled workers are geographically
immobile, while skilled workers are allowed to move across regions whenever their
lifetime expected utility is higher in the other region. The ownership structure of the
economy is such that L-workers own the entire regional endowment of Land and they
rent it to the H-workers,4 while skilled workers own the stock of existing patents in
the initial period.
Each region is a unidimensional space where H-workers live in a residential area
and research facilities locate in a central business district (CBD). Each H-worker
consumes one unit of land and commutes to the CBD to work. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that L-workers live downtown and do not have commuting
costs. This hypothesis greatly simpli￿es the algebra of the model and does not have
any impact on the spatial distribution of economic activities as unskilled workers are
geographically immobile.5
4This assumption is particularly useful for the derivation of the model as it greatly simpli￿es the
algebra, but it does not in￿uence our results either in terms of spatial equilibria or welfare analysis.
It introduces a source of positive pecuniary externality (for the unskilled) in the location of skilled
workers. This does not impact on the spatial equilibria because unskilled workers are not allowed
to migrate. Two alternatives are available in this framework. First, it is possibile to assume that
land rents may be shared with the skilled workers. This may create an attenuation of the positive
(negative) externality for the unskilled (skilled), but as Murata and Thisse (2005) point out, the
redistribution of the rents to the mobile factor is a second order e￿ect, which has no impact on the
spatial equilibria. Second, we could assume that land is owned by citizens from an outside country,
but once again this does not impact on the spatial allocation of the skilled workers.
5This assumption is actually inconsequential for the spatial equilibria of this model. Indeed, (i)
unskilled workers are not allowed to migrate and (ii) if regions are symmetric in size, the average
productivity of an industrial ￿rm is the same in both regions. We should assume asymmetries in
the number of L-workers to obtain a Ricardian di￿erence in productivity, but the study of this
hypothesis goes beyond the scope of this paper. The economic interpretation of this assumption may
be twofold. On one hand, empirical evidence on urban sprawl in US cities shows (Glaeser et al.,
8The total number of H-workers in the economy is normalized to one, while the
total number of unskilled workers is 2L (L for each region). Each region r has a share
￿r of H-workers living within its borders. In equilibrium, in each region H-workers






, where the CBD
locates at x = 0.
Skilled labour supply is in￿uenced by commuting costs to the CBD. As in Murata
and Thisse (2005), we assume that commuting costs are an increasing linear function
of the distance to the CBD. Labor supply for an H-worker is:
s(x) = 1 ￿ 2￿jxj (1)
￿ < 1 to ensure strictly positive labour supply and jxj is the distance to the CBD.
The worse the infrastructure endowment (high ￿) or the greater the distance to the
CBD, the lower the labour supply.




wr = (1 ￿ ￿￿r)wr,
where wr is the skilled wage prevailing in region r.
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2000) that rich people tend to \escape" from city centres and usually have longer commuting times
due to transportation by car. On the other hand, it is possible to think of the CBD as a research
cluster in which all research labs concentrate, while production facilities locate elsewhere. In this
case, regions are totally segmented and skilled and unskilled tend to live and work in separate places.
92.2 Consumer’s problem










e￿￿(t)tEl (t)dt = Il
V r
l (t) is the utility level attained by consumer l in region r at time t. ￿ is his
subjective discount rate. El (t) is the expenditure of consumer l at time t and Il
is the present discounted values of his labour wages and rents. ￿(t) is the instan-
taneous interest rate of a global bond, which is available in both regions and can
be traded across time. Budget constraint states that the (present discounted) value
of expenditure must equalize the consumer’s wealth, which is made by the present
discounted value of labour wage plus assets (land rents for unskilled and industrial
rents for skilled). The equality condition is particularly important as it rules out the
possibility of chain-letters (Ponzi games): each individual is not allowed to borrow a
positive amount of assets without being able to repay it in future times. Therefore,
the value of the ￿nancial assets at t ! 1, should always be non-negative.
Utility level V r
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1￿￿ (4)
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10T represents the consumption of the traditional good, ￿ is the share of expenditure
on the industrial good, M is the total mass of varieties, q(i) is the consumption of
variety i of the horizontally di￿erentiated goods and p(i) is its price. ￿ is the elasticity
of substitution among varieties and pT is the price of the traditional good.
The Traditional good is freely traded and produced under constant returns to
scale, with a one-to-one production function. Its price is constant across regions and
it can be normalized to one (T is the nummeraire). The Industrial good is subject to
a transportation cost which, as usual in the literature, takes the form of a \melting
iceberg": in order to deliver one unit to region m, a producer in region r must ship
￿ ￿ 1 units. Industrial ￿rms ￿nd it optimal to adopt mill pricing (Baldwin et al.,
2003).
Problems (3) and (4) are solved in two consecutive steps.
In step one, using the standard intertemporal maximization condition (Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 1995) consumers choose the intertemporal consumption path obtaining




= ￿(t) ￿ ￿ (5)
Once the expenditure level is chosen for each period of time, Cobb-Douglas pref-
erences imply that each consumer spends a constant fraction of expenditure on each
type of good. In particular, Marshallian demands for T-good and each variety i of
M-good are:
6Formal derivation of the Euler condition implies the presence of a trasversality condition on the
assets: the value of ￿nancial assets as t ! 1 is zero. Consumers ￿nd it optimal to consume their
assets in t 2 [0;1), rather than to save them until t ! 1. The reason is that asset detention does
not raise the utility level, while consumption does. Formally, the trasversality condition implies that
limt!1 h(t)b(t) = 0, where b(t) is the total amount of assets at time t and h(t) is the shadow price
of income (i.e. the constraint of the Hamiltonian, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, ch. 2).
11T = (1 ￿ ￿)El (t) (6)
q(i) = ￿p(i)￿￿P￿￿1











Pr is a price aggregator for the industrial good. Mr is the total number of varieties
produced in region r and ￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿ is a measure of free-ness of trade.7







2.3.1 Final good sector (industrial/di￿erentiated)
The industrial good is produced under increasing returns to scale due to the presence
of a ￿xed cost, which takes the form of the purchase of a patent, a necessary condition
to start the production of a di￿erentiated good. Patents last forever and each producer
has a monopoly over the variety produced. The marginal cost is determined by the
use of an additional worker L, whose wage (and marginal product) is one, under the
hypothesis of non-full specialization of the most industrialized region.
Standard pro￿t maximization implies that the price for good i is p(i) = ￿
￿￿1. The



















m is the region other than s. Imperfect competition and iceberg trade costs imply
that (a) consumption of the industrial good is home-biased and operating pro￿ts tend
7When ￿ = 1, free trade prevails, for ￿ = 0, interregional trade is prohibitive.
12to be higher in the larger market and (b) tougher competition in the home-market
(Mr) lowers the operating pro￿ts due to the market crowding e￿ect.
2.3.2 Innovation
Patents are produced by perfectly competitive laboratories. The productivity of each
H-worker is in￿uenced by (a) the accumulated stock of knowledge: the larger the
stock of knowledge available for each researcher the less costly the production of an
additional patent. This condition ensures endogenous growth; (b) localized knowledge
spillovers among researchers: the productivity of each researcher is positively in￿u-
enced by face-to-face \exchanges of ideas" within each region; research conducted in
the other region only partially ￿lters across space. The idea is based upon extensive
empirical evidence according to which \location and proximity clearly matter in ex-
ploiting knowledge spillovers" (Audretsch and Feldman, 2004); (c) congestion costs
within each region: R&D activities can be performed only in the labouratories located
in the CBD and all commuting time is \wasted".8
We adopt a very simple regional knowledge production function. The total number









M = Mr + Ms
￿ 2 [0;1] represents the extent of interregional knowledge spillovers. When ￿ = 1,
knowledge spillovers are global, when ￿ = 0 knowledge spillovers are absent. LSH
r is
8This hypotheisis neglects all social and working interactions during the commuting time. In
practical terms, R&D workers never work on an hypothetical train to the CBD, but tend to use their
car to go to work. This hypothesis is supported by Glaeser et al. (2000) according to which skilled
and wealthy people tend to commute by car, while poorer people concentrate in areas with a better
access to public transport.
13the total amount of labour supplied by skilled workers in region r. LSH
r is in￿uenced









































As in Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), the steady state growth
path is determined by the endogenous production of new varieties in the economy.
Hence, the growth rate is determined by:
@M
@t
= nA + nB = Mg (￿)
g (￿) = 1 Maximum growth rate (14)
￿2￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) Knowledge Spillovers E￿ect
￿￿[1 ￿ 3￿(1 ￿ ￿)] Commuting costs e￿ect





1 ￿ 4￿ + 2￿
2 (3 + ￿) ￿ 2￿
3 (1 + ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿
Interaction term
Where ￿ = ￿A and 1￿￿ = ￿B. g(￿) indicates the aggregate growth function and
depends solely on the spatial distribution of skilled workers. g(￿) can be decomposed
into four elements.
The ￿rst is the maximum growth rate (equal to one) that can be achieved by the
economy if localized knowledge spillovers and commuting costs do not matter. The
second is the knowledge spillovers e￿ect (KSE), according to which aggregate growth
is maximized either when skilled workers agglomerate in one region (￿=1 or 0) or
when knowledge spillovers are global (￿=1). The third component represents the
impact of the commuting costs e￿ect (CCE) on the growth rate. Commuting costs
minimize the aggregate growth rate when skilled workers concentrate in one region
14only. The fourth is a term indicating higher order interaction e￿ects between KSE
and CCE.
Eq. (14) is a fourth degree polynomial and it shows a clear trade-o￿ between the
e￿ects of knowledge spillovers and commuting costs on location and growth. Quite
interestingly, this equation suggests the existence of possible decreasing returns from
agglomeration in the growth equation. This is a new feature in the agglomeration and
growth literature as it suggests the existence of a more complex relationship between
the location of skilled workers and the steady state growth. The novelty lies in the
fact that, in this model, geography matters for growth, but its e￿ects depend on the
interactions between the extent of knowledge spillovers and the degree of congestion
costs. In particular:
Proposition 1:
For 2 ￿ 2
q
1+￿
3￿￿ < ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿, g(￿) has three local maxima in ￿ = 0, ￿ = 1=2 and
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), both symmetric and agglomerated equilibria represent local
maxima. Proposition 1 is able to detect whether aggregate growth is lower under
symmetry rather than agglomeration. In particular, for commuting costs smaller
than ^ ￿, core-periphery maximizes aggregate growth because KSE is larger than CCE.
2.4 Market clearing and migration
We can now determine the market clearing conditions for unskilled and skilled workers.
Unskilled - Being LM
r = Mrqr the demand for unskilled workers by the M-sector




￿ (EA + EB) = ￿￿￿1
￿ E where E is the aggregate expenditure in the
economy.
Demand for unskilled workers by the T-sector in the economy is LT = (1 ￿ ￿)E.
Since LT + LM
A + LM







Eq.(15) shows that aggregate expenditure is constant over time and depends solely
on the total number of unskilled workers (2L), on the share of manufacturing on ex-
penditure (￿) and on the monopolistic distortion in the M-sector (￿). Moreover,
eq. (15) implies that expenditure path is constant and consumers smooth their con-
sumption over time (eq. (5) is equal to zero and ￿(t) = ￿ in each point in time):
instantaneous individual expenditure equals a share ￿ of the present discounted value
of individual incomes. Finally, we can state the incomplete specialization condition in
a more formal way: the T-sector is active in both regions if production of T-good in
one region is not su￿cient to cover world demand, i.e. L < (1 ￿ ￿) 2L
1￿
￿
￿ ) ￿ < ￿
2￿￿1.
Skilled - The Skilled market clears by imposing the zero pro￿t condition on the
industrial and R&D sectors. Entrepreneurs invest the present discounted value of the
operating pro￿ts to buy one patent to start production.
The average cost for producing one patent is given by the ratio between the total
amount of H-workers’ wages in region r (i.e., LSH
r wr) and the production of patents








The average cost of one patent should equalize the present discounted value of the
operating pro￿ts, ￿r; the equilibrium wage for the H-workers is therefore:
w￿




16Migration - Migration occurs whenever the present discounted value of the utility
level in one region is higher than the present discounted value of the utility level in
the other region. We assume a migration law such that, when agglomeration occurs,
skilled workers smoothly decide to migrate. Migration occurs in the transitional
dynamics, while in the steady-state skilled workers do not have any incentive to
migrate.
Suppose that migrations take place in a period of time between 0 and T. This
implies that all skilled workers are indi￿erent in their migration time t 2 [0;T]. The
aggregate migration law is therefore:
d￿
dt
= ￿e￿t [V (0;t) ￿ V (0;T)] (17)
￿ > 0 is the speed of adjustment (i.e. a parameter for the migration cost) and
V (0;t) is the utility level for a skilled worker who lived in region B from time 0 to
time t and then migrates to region A.9
3 Agglomeration and Growth with immobile patents
3.1 Steady-state growth path when ￿ is ￿xed
Suppose that each patent created in region r can be used only by manufacturing ￿rms




r k(￿r)M = LSH
r k(￿r)eg(￿)tM0 (18)










g(￿) represents the share of growth due to the contribution of
region r.
9For a microfoundation of this migration law (with migration costs) we refer to FT.
17In the steady state (i.e. Mr (0) = ￿r (￿)M0), the regional share of aggregate




= ￿r (￿) (19)
@Mr
@t
= g (￿)Mr (t)
We can now re-write steady state regional price levels, wage rates for skilled work-


























￿ [￿ + g (￿)]
(22)
E￿
r (￿) represents the steady state expenditure level in region r under spatial dis-
tribution of skilled workers ￿.
3.2 SS-growth path when migration is allowed
In the long-run, skilled workers move across regions in response to regional di￿erences
in the present discounted values of their indirect utilities. Since in steady-state
migration does not occur, we focus on \migration proof" spatial con￿gurations, in
which each worker has no incentives to \change place" over time.
10It is important to note that when the manufacturing sector concentrates in region A, in steady-
state region B grows at the same rate as region A. This is due to a terms of trade e￿ect. Continuous
production of new varieties decreases the price index of the industrial good (which is exported by
region A). As a result, terms of trade and income of region B increase over time as the relative price
of the traditional good increases. Real permanent income (and expenditure) may di￿er over time
due to the presence of transportation costs and land rents.
18Consider, for each t > 0, a piecewise continuous function ’(t) which assumes the
value one when the individual is located in A and zero when he lives in B.
Let ~ W (￿;’(t)) be the present discounted value of all the net wages received by a
skilled worker according to his migration path.








e￿￿t [1 ￿ ’(t)][1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]w￿
B (￿)dt
= ￿ ’(1 ￿ ￿￿)w￿
A (￿) + (1 ￿ ￿ ’)[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]w￿
B (￿) (23)




￿ ’ is the (present discounted) share of time spent in region A.
VH (￿; ￿ ’) is de￿ned as the lifetime utility of a skilled worker under location path
￿ ’:

















ln[￿a(￿) + ￿ ’(1 ￿ ￿￿)w￿

















PB(t). Eq. (24) represents the life-time utility level of an individual
who spends a share ￿ ’ of his life in region A and a share 1 ￿ ￿ ’ in region B. A skilled
worker chooses his optimal migration path by maximizing eq. (24) with respect to










19In order to ￿nd an analytical solution to this intertemporal problem, we ￿rst derive
￿rst and second order conditions for eq.(24):






A (￿) ￿ [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]w￿
B (￿)
￿a(￿) + ￿ ’(1 ￿ ￿￿)w￿
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A (￿) ￿ [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]w￿
B (￿)
￿a(￿) + ￿ ’(1 ￿ ￿￿)w￿





If a steady-state \migration proof" spatial con￿guration is not Core-Periphery,
then it is a symmetric equilibrium.
Proof:
See Appendix 2.
Proposition 2 states the existence of at most two steady-state spatial con￿gurations
in this model: a symmetric one and an agglomerated one. This implies that when
core-periphery con￿guration is unstable, symmetry prevails and viceversa.
Stability analysis is performed by analysing the e￿ects of a small perturbation
in the individual’s migration decisions. We assume that ￿ ’ diminishes in a contour
of ￿ ’ = 1 when all skilled workers are concentrated in region A (i.e. ￿ = 1). In
other words, we suppose that a skilled worker decides to \try" to migrate for a small
period of time to region B, when all skilled workers live in the core. Whenever his
lifetime utility diminishes, this perturbation is self-stabilizing and the agglomerated
equilibrium is stable. Otherwise, core-periphery is unstable and symmetry prevails.
In analytical terms, agglomeration is a stable equilibrium if and only if:
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Using wage, price and growth equations and recalling that E = 2L
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As usual in the NEG literature, the stability of spatial equilibria depends on the
level of trade freeness ￿, on the elasticity of substitution across varieties (￿), on the
share of income spent on manufactures (￿) and on the degree of commuting costs (￿).
Moreover, given the dynamic nature of this model, the extent of localized knowledge
spillovers (￿) and the subjective discount rate (￿) play an important role in shaping
the stability of the steady-state equilibria. In the remaining part of this Section we
perform the classical \thought experiment" of the NEG literature by analysing what
happens when a trade liberalization occurs (i.e. when parameter ￿ gradually passes
from zero to one), by focussing on two main parameters of this model: the extent of
commuting costs and inter-regional knowledge spillovers.
Inequality (28) shows that the smaller the extent of localized knowledge spillovers
(￿ ! 0), the more likely a core-periphery outcome. The intuition is simple and well
known in the literature. The more productive a skilled worker under agglomeration
21the higher his wage. This is a strong centripetal force. Commuting costs have two
opposite e￿ects on the stability of core-periphery. On one hand, higher commuting
costs diminish skilled workers’ net wage under agglomeration (a centrifugal force). On
the other hand, high commuting costs decrease the speed of creation of new patents
and increase the ￿rms’ present discounted value of pro￿ts, the value of each patent
and skilled workers’ wage (a centripetal force).
Analytically, ￿(￿) is a concave function with a unique maximum in ￿
￿, ￿(0) !
￿1, ￿0 (1) < 0. Unfortunately, we are not able to solve this equation analytically
for ￿(￿) = 0, given the logarithmic part in the price e￿ect. Anyway, when trade
costs diminish, we are able to observe three di￿erent con￿gurations (or outcomes)
depending on the level of parameters ￿ and ￿:
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(c) ￿ ￿ e ￿; ￿(￿) < 0;8￿.
In other words, under con￿guration (a) there exists a unique solution for ￿(￿) = 0
in the economically relevant interval ￿ 2 (0;1]. Under con￿guration (b) the equation
has two solutions, while under con￿guration (c) function ￿(￿) is always negative
and the equation has no real-valued solutions. Unfortunately, while we are able to
discriminate between con￿guration (a) and (b), it is not possible to obtain a closed
form value for e ￿, which separates con￿guration (b) and (c). We provide an implicit
expression.
Due to these di￿culties and the triviality of con￿guration (c) (in which symmetry
is never broken), we focus on con￿gurations (a) and (b) only, which are also the most
22economically interesting results.11
Con￿guration (a) is the typical Krugman-type agglomeration in which the econ-
omy experiences two phases. When trade costs are high (￿ < ￿
sustain), symmetry
across regions prevails. At ￿ = ￿
sustain symmetry is no longer sustainable and skilled
workers start migrating from region B to A. This process is smooth and income diver-
gence occurs in the economy until a new (agglomerated) steady-state equilibrium is
reached. Region A experiences a growth take-o￿ in the transitional dynamics, while
region B slows down and specializes in the traditional sector. Once the new agglom-
erated steady state is reached (￿ ￿ ￿
sustain), income inequality persists, as the only
source of income growth in region B is a terms of trade e￿ect due to the technical
progress in region A.
Con￿guration (b) has richer implications and describes a \bell-shaped" agglom-
eration process. The economy experiences three phases. When trade costs are very
high (￿ < ￿






in con￿guration (a) divergence occurs and industrial activities concentrate in region
A. When trade liberalizes further, (￿ > ￿
s2), spatial equilibria change and, in the
transitional dynamics, skilled workers start to migrate back to the periphery. This
triggers a process of cumulative growth in region B.
Interestingly, dispersion does not imply that the core region loses in terms of ac-
tive ￿rms. It just implies that region B catches up with region A, which slows down
due to the loss of human capital. In other words, in the transitional dynamics the
number of ￿rms in region A continues to increase, although at a slower rate than
11It should be noted that a su￿cient condition for con￿guration (b) to exist is that ^ ￿ ￿ ￿ >


















for this derivation is as follows. First, divide function ￿(￿) = F (￿) + G(￿), where F (￿) =
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23before, but region B registers a steady growth in the creation of new ￿rms, which
is much larger than the region A rate of growth. This describes a regional conver-
gence process in the economy. Compared with static models of economic geography,
this seems a more reasonable representation of reality, as many \second waves" at
regional scale frequently imply an \enlargement" of the industrial core, rather than
a rough relocation of economic activities to the periphery.12 The economics of the
dispersion is simple: as soon as trade costs become low enough, peripheral producers
are able to serve the core (the bigger market) without locating in the agglomerated
region, in which both congestion and competition are particularly tough. However,
interregional knowledge spillovers play also an important role. A necessary condition
for re-dispersion is that once a small number of skilled workers decide to migrate to
the periphery, they should bene￿t from the R&D spillovers from the core, otherwise
their productivity is too low to trigger the catching-up process (note that when ￿ = 0,
con￿guration (b) is never reached). In other words, the two regions should not be \too
distant" in terms of trade and knowledge ￿ows. This mechanism clearly resembles the
￿ndings of Kim (1995, 1998): the spectacular catching up of southern states in the
US in the second half of the twentieth century can be attributed mainly to a sharp
change in the southern economic structure (from agriculture to manufacturing), even
when the north-south wage gap was ￿lled in the second post-war period. The increase
in the number of industrial plants in the South may be due to a fall in interregional
transportation costs, which rendered the location of an industrial plant in the south
comparatively more pro￿table (see Kim and Margo, 2004, for a discussion). Once
again, we did not observe a rough relocation of industrial plants, rather, industrial
activity, once thin on the ground of the southern states, started to expand with a
self-sustained cumulative growth process.
Finally, using Proposition 1 we ￿nd that, under con￿guration (b), core-periphery
12See, for example, the industrialization processes in the North-East of Italy or in Bavaria (Ger-
many) in the post-war period.
24does not maximize aggregate growth as ￿ > 1￿￿. This implies that the \enlargement"
of the industrial core of the economy is coupled with a growth acceleration of the
entire economy. We will make use of this prediction in the next Section for the
welfare analysis.
4 \Should we mind the gap?" Maybe yes!
In chapter 11 of their book, FT present their welfare analysis with an interesting
question: \Should we mind the gap?". Their answer is that, probably we should not
mind the welfare gap agglomeration creates since, with localized knowledge spillovers,
static loss of unskilled workers in the periphery (i.e. higher price level) are likely to
be overcome by the dynamic gains due to higher growth.13
In this model we allowed for the existence of congestion costs adding both an
additional static loss (i.e. loss of land rents) and a dynamic loss (lower growth due to
longer commutes) for the unskilled living in the periphery.
Our welfare analysis takes the very simple form of a Pareto optimality evaluation
of the core-periphery outcome. We are aware that this de￿nition is quite restrictive
(P￿ueger and Suedekum, forthcoming; Charlot et al., 2006), but it has the clear
advantage of being directly comparable with FT analyses.
Pareto optimality of agglomeration emerges if unskilled workers in the periphery
are at least indi￿erent (or better-o￿) under agglomeration compared to dispersion.14
13Fujita and Thisse conclude that \the increase of regional disparities does not necessarily imply
the impoverishment of the peripheral region. [...] it is not clear that agglomeration, growth and equity
do con￿ict: even people residing in the periphery are better-o￿ in the core-periphery structure than
under dispersion".
14Skilled workers always choose their migration pattern to maximize the present discounted value
of the utility levels. Therefore, agglomeration never occurs if it does not maximize their welfare.
Unskilled workers living in the core enjoy, under agglomeration, both a lower price level and higher
land rents and they are always better-o￿ under agglomeration.
25Expenditure at each point in time for an L-worker residing in B is composed of his
labour income plus the aggregate land rent per capita: EB





Given the upper-tier Cobb-Douglas utility function, we obtain that the indirect




















L (t;￿)dt and using (3), we obtain:
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Equation (30) describes the welfare gains and losses for an unskilled worker in the
periphery when a core-periphery con￿guration emerges. The ￿rst term (in squared
brackets) on the right-hand side describes the static loss derived from agglomeration.





2)<0 is the land rent loss occurring when all skilled work-




(1+￿)<0 is the price level loss when unskilled









is the (possible) dynamic gain from agglomeration derived
from higher growth under core-periphery.
A necessary condition for an overall welfare improvement is that growth under
core-periphery is larger than under symmetry. As we have seen in the previous Section,
this condition is never respected under con￿guration (b) when ￿ > 1 ￿ ￿. Therefore,
although from a qualitative point of view our result is similar to that of FT (i.e.
26core-periphery is Pareto improving if and only if it creates enough growth), from
the quantitative point of view we observe a huge di￿erence due to the presence of
both a larger static loss (the loss of housing rents) and a smaller dynamic gain (lower
aggregate growth). A policy-maker should now intervene whenever the economy is
under con￿guration (b).
5 Conclusions
Localized knowledge spillovers and congestion are two of the most distinguishing
characteristics of the regional analysis. They are likely to shape both the spatial
con￿gurations and the long-run productivity gains of an economy. The aim of this
paper is to treat both in a uni￿ed framework by showing the e￿ects of congestion on
a process of agglomeration and growth in a dynamic general equilibrium process with
endogenous growth and location of workers/production.
Our results show that the introduction of congestion costs in a model of \agglom-
eration and growth" is likely to greatly in￿uence the long-run spatial con￿gurations
of the economy.
First, we show how congestion may a￿ect the long-run (steady state) growth rate
of the economy even in the presence of localized knowledge spillovers.
Then, according to the interplay between the knowledge spillovers and the con-
gestion costs, we are able to obtain both a Krugman-type and a Bell-shaped agglom-
eration e￿ects. In the ￿rst case (con￿guration (a)) we obtain the well-known result
of a permanent income inequality in the steady state and income divergence in the
transitional dynamics. This occurs when interregional knowledge spillovers are low
compared with the congestion costs; i.e. when the knowledge transmission is sticky
and can be done mainly by face-to-face interactions. In the second case (con￿guration
(b)) we have richer implications. After an initial period of income divergence and ag-
glomeration in the core region, we observe a re-dispersion of economic activities which
27takes the form of an \enlargement of the core". This occurs when regional integra-
tion in terms of knowledge transmission is strong enough, i.e. knowledge spillovers
are large compared with congestion costs. Quite interestingly, aggregate growth is
likely to be larger under symmetry than under agglomeration.
Finally, welfare analysis shows that core-periphery creates a welfare gap between
unskilled workers in the core and unskilled workers in the periphery. The existence
of decreasing returns of agglomeration in the knowledge production function may
create (in the bell-shaped agglomeration case) a negative welfare e￿ect on periph-
eral unskilled workers and it renders the agglomerated equilibrium Pareto inferior to
dispersion.
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Appendix 1: Simulations and Comparative Statics
The values of the sustain points ￿
sustain, ￿
s1 and ￿
s2 may vary at any change of
knowledge spillovers and commuting costs.
30In Figure 1, we show the values of ￿
sustain, ￿
s1 and ￿
s2 when the parameter ￿ is
allowed to vary between zero and one. Simulation parameters are ￿ = 0:3, ￿ = 2:5,
￿ = 0:6, ￿ = 0:02.
[Figure 1, here]
For all the values of ￿ above the red (continuous) and below the blue (dashed) lines,
core-periphery is sustainable, otherwise symmetry is the only steady-state outcome.
For all the values above the green (dotted) line, the core-periphery outcome is Pareto
superior to symmetry.
When knowledge spillovers are zero, con￿guration (a) is always sustainable.
As knowledge spillovers increase, the economy, starting from a con￿guration (a)
situation changes in a con￿guration (b) whenever ￿ becomes bigger than 1￿￿ = 0:7.
This is due to the fact that dynamic centripetal forces lose their strength and static
and dynamic centrifugal forces overcome them. Moreover, ￿gure 1 shows that all
the core-periphery con￿gurations below the green (dashed) line and all the symmet-
ric con￿gurations above the same line are not Pareto optimal. As we show in the
text, core-periphery under con￿guration (b) is never Pareto improving. A welfare
maximizing policy-maker, therefore, should intervene to correct these externalities.
A similar picture occurs when the parameter ￿ is allowed to vary between zero
and one.
Appendix 2: proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
Given its symmetric shape around ￿ = 1=2, g (￿) has a unique minimum in ￿ =
1=2.


























, its ￿rst derivative in ￿ = 0 is negative and its
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Proof of Proposition 2:
￿ ’ takes the value of one, when the H-worker spends all his life in region A, while
it takes the value of zero, when he spends all his life in region B. Therefore, spatial
distribution ￿ 2 (0;1) is migration-proof if and only if the present discounted utility
level in region A is equal to the present discounted utility level in region B. This means
that V (￿;1) = V (￿;0) = maxfV (￿; ￿ ’) : ￿ ’ 2 [0;1]g. This implies that V (￿; ￿ ’) is not
strictly concave15 on the compact set ￿ ’ 2 [0;1]. Hence, in order for ￿ 2 (0;1) to be
a maximum (and eq. (26) to hold), w￿
A (1 ￿ ￿￿) = w￿
B [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]. Therefore eq.
(25) is equal to zero if and only if P A
B (￿) = 1. This happens when ￿ = 1
2.
15It should be pointed out that the use of both condition (26) and de￿nition of a migration proof
equilibrium (V (￿;1) = V (￿;0) = maxfV (￿; ￿ ’) : ￿ ’ 2 [0;1]g) automatically discard the possibility
of existence of local maxima, i.e. points in ￿ ’ 2 [0;1] in which the equation is locally concave.
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